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Divine Intervention?
The extent and speed ofthe depreciation of the
foreign exchange value of the dollar since the
bE@ririirig of 1985 surprised arid alarmed ana-
lysts, policymakers, and business leaders alike.
Reaching a peak in February 1985, the dollar's
fall initially was welcomed as the long-overdue
market adjustment of an over-valued currency.
But the dollar's continued slide aroused fears
that the currency was falling too far and too fast,
resulting in renewed inflationary pressures in the
U.5. and slower economic growth abroad. These
concerns led finance ministers and central
bankers at the Louvre meeting of the Group of
Seven (U.S., Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain,
France, and Canada) in February last year to
issue a communique calling for greater dollar
stability. The communique stated that currencies
were now "within ranges broadly consistent
with underlying fundamentals," and the govern-
ments agreed to stabilize the dollar both by
altering their macroeconomic policies and by
intervening in the foreign exchange markets to
prevent "excessive" volatility.
Since the Louvre G-7 meeting, central bank
intervention in foreign exchange markets has
been massive. Central banks abroad have pur-
chased billions of dollars in foreign exchange
markets. West German international reserves
jumped more than 50 percent last year - grow-
ing to $79.3 billion from $51.7 billion during
1987. Japan's reserves jumped more than 90
percent in 1987, growing to $81.0 billion from
$42.3 billion. Italy, the United Kingdom, and
Canada had similar proportional gains.
This Letter reviews the theory of and recent
experience with foreign exchange market inter-
vention and finds that intervention policy alone
cannot be relied upon to stabilize the value of
the dollar within a particular target zone unless
it also is supported by a shift in monetary policy
stance. Recent easing of monetary policies in
Japan and Germany may contribute to dollar sta-
bility ifthese policies are sl:lstained.
Monetary Intervention
To analyze the exchange rate impact of official
intervention in the foreign exchange market, it is
important to distinguish between "monetary," or
unsterilized, intervention operations and "non-
monetary," or sterilized, intervention operations.
In a monetary intervention aimed at supporting
the dollar, the Bank ofJapan Uapan's central
bank), for example, typically buys dollars from a
Tokyo bank and credits the bank's reserve posi-
tion in yen. The Tokyo bank ends up with fewer
dollars (its foreign currency asset) and greater
yen (home currency) reserves. Such intervention
by the Bank ofJapan creates a position ofexcess
reserve holdings for the Japanese banking
system.
With excess reserves, Japanese banks are in a
position to expand domestic (yen-based) lend-
ing. The greater availability of credit offered by
banks, in turn, tends to lower its price - Jap-
anese interest rates - and raise the stock of
deposit money. Increased deposit money bal-
ances is the monetary component of interven-
tion operations.
This monetary component of official interven-
tion is likely to have powerful effects on
exchange rates. Lower relative interest rates in
Japan, for example, generate an outflow offunds
to U.5. capital markets as the yields on Japanese
securities fall relative to U.5. securities. As inves-
tors try to sell Japanese securities and buy dol-
lars to acquire higher yielding U.S. securities,
upward pressure is placed on the dollar
exchange rate and it appreciates. Moreover, if
market participants believe that intervention
operations represent or "signal" the Japanese
central bank's willingness to sustain such easing,
the effect on exchange rates likely will be
magnified.
Numerous empirical studies indicate strong
causal links running from monetary intervention
to exchange rates. This is not surprising. The
monetary effects (money supply changes and
interest rate movements) of such intervention
operations working through the foreign
exchange market are analogous to regular open
market monetary operations working through
the domestic bond market. Both change bankFRBSF
reserve holdings in an analogous fashion. The
difference between the two is that in the inter-
vention case, private banks' foreign asset hold-
ings are changed, while in the case of open
market operations, banks' domestic bond hold-
ings are changed. Hence, sustained monetary
intervention likely will have a powerful and
long-lasting effect on exchange rates primarily to
the extent that it represents a fundamental
change in the central bank's monetary policy
stance. That is, monetary intervention influences
the overall money growth rate, in addition to
shifting the apparatus ofmonetary control from
domestic open market operations to intervention
in the foreign exchange market.
Non-monetary Intervention
In the previous example, the Bank ofJapan's
purchase of dollars in the Tokyo foreign
exchange market was allowed to increase the
Japanese money supply and lower Japanese
interest rates. The Bank ofJapan, however,
could pursue non-monetary intervention byoff-
setting or "sterilizing" this monetary effect
through the sale of a domestic (yen-denomi-
nated) security in open market operations. This
action reduces Japanese commercial bank yen
reserves to their initial level. TheJapanese bank-
ing sector would have more domestic securities
in its portfolio, and fewer dollar-denominated
securities (those purchased bythe Bank of
Japan).
Japanese banks may have preferred the initial
mix of securities in their portfolios. If so, they
will try to restore their portfolios by buying dol-
lar-denominated securities and selling yen
securities. This private shift toward dollar
securities at the expense of yen securities is
likely to induce capital outflow from Japan
towards the U.5., which, if quantitatively impor-
tant, would place upward pressure on the dollar
exchange rate and cause it to appreciate.
These non-monetary or "sterilized" intervention
operations are likely to have much weaker
effects on exchange rates than their monetary
counterparts, however. Empirical research either
has failed to find any significant effects of ster-
ilized intervention on exchange rates, or has
found that both its initjal magnitude and dura-
tion over time seem to vary from episode to
episode.
There are several reasons why the effects of ster-
ilized intervention on exchange rates are likely
to be small, and to some extent unpredictable.
First, sterilized intervention, by definition, offsets
monetary effects and works only through
changes in interest rates associated with port-
folio rebalancing. Second, investors may view
foreign and domestic securities as reasonably
close substitutes, at least on the margin. In our
example, ifJapanese banks largely are indif-
ferent between yen and dollar-denominated
securities on the margin, the Bank ofJapan's
attempts to stabilize the dollar by buying dollar
securities for yen securities is likely to induce
only a small rebalancing effort and a small effect
on exchange rates and interest rates.
Third, investors' asset preferences between
domestic and foreign securities respond to a
variety offactors, including expectations regard-
ing future policies, prospects for inflation, and
the overall investment climate. Thus, other fac-
tors besides central banks' sterilized intervention
operations also "upset" investors' portfolio bal-
ance, and may work against the intervention
operations. Most important in this regard are
bond financed government budget deficits,
which may introduce billions of dollars of new
security issues into private portfolios every year.
Deficit financing "upsets" portfolio balance, and
in turn, induces capital flows and exchange rate
effects on a scale typically much greater than
that associated with sterilized intervention
operations.
For these reasons, the effect of non-monetary, or
sterilized, central bank intervention on exchange
rates is difficult to detect empirically. Unlike the
effects of monetary intervention, both the initial
impact and the duration of non-monetary inter-
vention seem to vary greatly in terms of magni-
tude and timing.
Recent Experience
On a day-to-day basis, the central banks of Ger-
many and Japan generally attempt to sterilize
their intervention operations. In effect, however,
both West Germany and Japan have allowed a
large part of their dollar purchases in the foreign
exchange market to go unsterilized following the
Louvre agreement. As a consequence, both Ger-
man and Japanese money growth has been rapid
over the past year. In Japan, the growth rate ofbroad money has accelerated almost continu-
ously since thebeginningof last year, and for
the October-December quarter hit 11.8 percent
- the highest rate since the second quarter of
1979. The Bank ofJapan is projecting even
higher growth this quarter. Similarly, money
growth in West Germany has overshot target
ranges for the second year in a row.
Supportingthese moves, both the Bank ofJapan
and the Bundesbank lowered their central bank
discount rates by 50 basis points early last year.
Money market interest rates also declined in
both countries - rates in Japan declined from
4.18 percent in December 1986 to 3.2 percent
recently, while rates in Germany declined from
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But have these moves helped stabilize exchange
rates? The evidence suggests that monetary inter-
vention has been moderately successful, while
the effects of non-monetary intervention have
been more difficult to detect. The dollar did not
stabilize immediately following the Louvre
agreement, despite large scale intervention oper-
ations that were allowed to have monetary
effects. Then, between May and August the dol-
lar rallied sharply, appreciating almost four per-
cent on a trade weighted (monthly average)
basis. However, when Germany and Japan tight-
ened monetary policy through domestic opera-
tions, the dollar's gains quickly were reversed
and the dollar depreciated a further 11 percent
after August (See chart.) Si l1ce the end of last
year, the dollar exchange rate has been some-
what more stable, but wasagain under down-
ward pressure at the end of March and in mid-
April.
Thus, it appears that sustained monetary ease
abroad may be necessary to stabilize the
exchange value of the dollar. In this context, the
recent bouts ofdollar weakness may be attribu-
table to uncertainty in the market over the Jap-
anese and German commitments to maintain
their present stances of monetary ease.
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Monetary ease in Japan and Germany was not
pursued uniformly during the course ofthe year,
however. In the late summer, the Bank ofJapan
and the Bundesbank made some attempt to slow
liquidity growth in response to a strengthening
dollar and concerns about the emergence of
inflationary expectations. The Bank ofJapan
tried to moderate credit expansion by limiting
discount window borrowings and allowed short-
term interest rates to rise in the face of strong
money market conditions. The Bundesbank also
raised short-term interest rates. However, con-
cern about the stability of the dollar and the
potential for financial market collapse that arose
in late October caused the two central banks to
abandon these attempts at restraint and continue
with more expansionary policies.
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The table entitled, "Selected Assets and Liabilities of Large Commercial Banks in the Twelfth
Federal Reserve District," will no longer be published in conjunction with the Weekly Letter.
For those in need of these data, a more timely publication entitled, "Weekly Consolidated
Condition Report of Large Commercial Banks and Domestic Subsidiaries" (F.R. 2416x), is
available from the Statistical and Data Services Department of this Bank.
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